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PROJECT-SPACE: A NEW DOCTRINE FOR WARFARE 
 
EXTRACT 
 
Managers have long drawn concepts from the military in meeting business challenges, 
from marketing to leadership. 
 
The aim of this paper is to illustrate how some project management concepts might assist 
the development of military doctrine for modern war 
 
Developments to date in military doctrine appear most sophisticated at the conventional 
warfighting end of the Spectrum of Conflict models used by most defence forces. The 
doctrine at the ‘peace’ end of the spectrum appears less so.  
 
Project management concepts, a ‘Project-space’ if you like, to accompany the Battle-
space concepts in military doctrine, is discussed, using the examples of integration and 
stakeholder management as leads.  
 
A Warspace Model, incorporating both sets of Battle and Project notions, appears to have 
good potential for depicting the true character of each conflict in the Spectrum, and for 
capturing the primary differences between all conflicts. 
 
 
Background 
 
Project Management as a discipline may have had its origins in war. Certainly, its early 
development occurred during World War II, fast-tracking General Macarthur’s island 
hopping advance towards the Phillipines. 
 
More generally, managers have long drawn ideas and concepts from the military so as to 
become more successful in meeting business challenges, from marketing to leadership. 
 
Non-military projects, too, can have well resourced and independent opposition – say, 
gaining entry to a market dominated by a competitor.  
 
In troubleshooting for such projects, or when completing forensic reviews of failed 
projects of this type, it is important to separate such ‘redfield’ or red projects from the 
analytical methodologies that might be used with failed Greenfield or Brownfield 
projects – business equivalents to military concepts assist such reviews. 
 
The aim of this paper is to illustrate how some project management concepts might return 
this benefit, by assisting with the development of military doctrine for modern war 
 
That aim will be developed through a brother notion to the existing military notion of 
‘battle-space’, namely the notion of ‘project-space’, leading to a proposal for a new 
Warspace Model for Warfare 
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Doctrine on War Fighting 
 
Current Models of Warfare. Please appreciate that, in addressing this topic, we are 
constrained to what is on the public record about current military thinking.  
 
Developments to date in doctrine, offered to assist the Commanders to conceptualize and 
communicate the situation of conflict faced by the forces under their command, might be 
represented by Figure 1. 
 
The concept essentially is a spectrum of types of conflicts. This spectrum is a sliding 
scale, moving from ‘War’ to ‘Peace’.  
 
Two broad categories of warfare are described, starting with ‘Conventional War’( as in 
World War II, Korea and parts of Vietnam) at one end of the spectrum, through to a 
series of scenarios of ‘Military Operations Other than Conventional War’ (such as East 
Timor, the Solomon Islands and Aceh) towards the other end of the Spectrum.  
 
 
                 WAR                                        PEACE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1: Types of Military Operations 
 
Australian and Canadian doctrine refer to the latter by the abbreviation ‘MOOCW’ 
pronounced ‘moo cow’. In US doctrine, a similar Spectrum is used, from ‘General War’ 
to ‘MOOTW’ – Military Operations Other Than War.  
 
With Figure 1 comes also a: 
• A series of definitions of each type of operations in this spectrum, a list that can 
stretch to 20 in number, and, 
• A categorization of these types of conflict based on combinations of the scale of 
conflict, intensity of conflict, and duration of conflict at hand,  
 
 
Offensive 
Operations 
Defensive 
Operations 
Support 
Operations 
Stability 
Operations 
Security 
Operations 
WARFIGHTING 
MILITARY 
OPERATIONS 
OTHER THAN 
CONVENTIONAL 
WAR 
 3
 
Other descriptions accompany these core ideas:  
• Phases of the battle or the campaign over time, say, pre-conflict, then conflict, 
then post conflict  
• Asymmetric Warfare, where one side has a tactic to which the adversary has little 
effective response  
• Non-linearity of warfare, where operations are distributed throughout the theatre 
of conflict rather than concentrated on a battlefield or battle-space – the term that 
the military prefer. This factor is termed ‘distributive’ warfare by US doctrine 
• The Multi-dimensional Battle, where an opponent is targeted from many sources, 
and not just from one source  
• The Perception Battle, the battle for the hearts and minds of non-combatant 
stakeholders, and  
• The ‘Strategic Corporal’, the criticality of the judgments made by the small unit 
leader in modern forms of warfare 
 
The last mentioned concept, in particular, emphasizes the importance of achieving 
‘Professional Mastery’ in dealing with the complexities of modern conflicts at as local a 
level of the modern ‘battlefield’ (or battle-space) as possible. 
 
This paper argues that Figure 1 is a bad starting point for the development of military 
doctrine, given the natures and the types of warfighting experienced in today’s theatres of 
operations 
 
 
Problems.  
 
There may be some inadequacies and some imbalances in this suite of concepts and tools, 
offered to Commanders and their staff.  
 
This imbalance and any inadequacy might be inhibiting the development of ‘mastery’ by 
commanders and corporals at war. 
 
An Imbalance. Firstly, while the tools provided for analysis of situations at the 
Conventional Warfighting end of the spectrum are quite sophisticated, they are only very 
rudimentary at the MOOCW end. 
 
Warfighting or Conventional War, as a doctrine, is armed with concepts and tools such as 
Mission Command, Battle-space Operating Systems, the Military Appreciation Process, 
‘combat functions’, and the ‘manoeuvrist approach’ – these tools and other constructs 
allow the Commander to fully appreciate any conventional warfighting situation from 
first principles.  
 
Consider the first two of these tools. 
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Mission Command is a mindset for the subordinate commander that allows him 
or her to make timely decisions responding to changes in situations without 
necessarily seeking further direction from their superior Commander. A focus on 
mission, endstate and main effort, including a first up review during planning of 
the mission given by the superior commander, facilitates such initiatives being 
made with good judgment. 
 
Taking initiative without orders is opposite to the military stereotype of obeying 
orders.  
 
In terms of management theory, mission command extends the concept of 
decision-making portrayed in management texts. Figure 2 may illustrate the 
extension that Mission Command might impose on the classic spectrum of 
decision-making described by Tannenbaum and Schmidt [1974] 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Tannenbaum & Schmidt Spectrum of Decision-Making 
 
 
Mission Command thus has a level of sophistication to sit readily amongst the 
best practices in the management of quick decision environments 
 
 
Battle-space Operating Systems. Similarly, the notion of Battle-space Operating 
Systems (or BOS) was a leap from previous tactics organized according to Corps, 
such as the Armoured Corps, the Artillery Corps, and the Air Corps.  
 
Command structures organized around the command of guns versus command of 
tanks versus command of air – this was a type of work breakdown structure (in 
project management terms) based upon training and competency with the use of 
specialized war equipment. The BOS replaced this breakdown structure for a 
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military force with a categorization of assets according to the impact or effect that 
the equipment could have on the battle-space.  
 
So tanks, guns and aircraft can be part of the BOS that delivers Firepower. Thus 
those resources, irrespective of Corps, need to be integrated into a Fireplan that 
maximizes the particular effect on the battle-space sought by the commander from 
the Firepower BOS.  
 
But also, and similarly, the tanks, guns and aircraft could also be integrated into 
the Mobility BOS or the Manoeuvre BOS depending upon the functionality of the 
type of tank, of the gun and gun ammunition or of the aircraft that is at hand 
 
Military doctrine has nothing as sophisticated as Mission Command and the BOS for its 
commanders and corporals to employ at the lower conflict end of Figure 1.  
 
This is the imbalance 
 
Commanders appear to extend and adapt their Conventional War concepts and tools 
when developing methods that they apply to Other-Than-Conventional-War conflicts. 
 
This has some disadvantages. 
 
Conflict, its scale, intensity and duration, is the vector used to construct the spectrum.  
 
Conflict, however, may not be the best vector to distinguish warfare situations when the 
level of conflict is low. Conflict, at the MOOCW end of the spectrum, may not be the 
dominant distinguisher 
 
The BOS may not be able to dominate the battle-space – there may not even be very 
much of a battle-space - when conflict levels are low 
 
Mission Command may equip commanders for quicker tactical response when War is 
hostile and furious, but it may not transfer strategic thinking to corporals when War is 
frustrating and ambiguous 
 
Asymmetric Warfare allows both sides to win, simultaneously, on their own preferred 
battlegrounds, which is in contrast with conventional warfare where both a winner and a 
loser emerge from the one battle 
 
The Non-linearity of Warfare renders fragmentation of the battle-space into a tactical 
advantage with lower level conflicts, in lieu of the concentration, scale and intensity that 
is organized to win at Conventional War 
 
The Multi-dimensional Battle may really be about the range of the targets that are under 
attack in a theatre of operations, rather than the number of sources of those attacks 
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And the Perception Battle is one where the non-combatants decide the winner, not the 
BOS 
 
 
The Inadequacy.  Secondly, it follows from the Imbalance, that at the MOOCW end of 
the spectrum, farthest from Conventional War, the  doctrine and methods of Conventional 
War may be removed from the vital dimensions of what is at issue in the MOOCW 
situations of warfare.  
 
In the doctrine represented by Figure 1, thinking may be too mission centric, or may have 
a tendency to dwell upon the battle component of what is happening in each form of 
conflict. The ‘battle-space’ notion has even been termed the ‘mission space’ in this 
context.  
 
The additional non-battle factors, that are alive in MOOCW or MOOTW conflicts, can be 
treated as restraints and constraints upon the Battle space Mission. This rationale is 
termed the ‘Concept of Limitations’ in British Military Doctrine.  
 
This limitations approach for extending mission thinking may constitute insufficient 
appreciation of these non-battle factors – particularly where these non-battle factors are 
the Drivers of the military strategy, rather than just constraints to the Battle Mission.  
 
Further, these additional non-battle factors may need to be treated in their own right, for 
their non-battle implications, as well as for any battle limitations. 
 
Considerations such as control of refugee traffic on military routes, collateral damage to 
the civilian population, and utilization of civil infrastructure may be sufficient when 
operations are a form of conventional or general warfare. At the other end of the 
spectrum, however, it may be the military or the battle-space concerns that may merit 
such simple treatment, given the totality of what is at issue.  
 
 
Possibilities.  
 
There are constructs that could compete with Mission, with BOS and with Battle-space, 
in guiding the responses of commanders and corporals to action in MOOCW situations 
 
These competing ideas might be given a place at the MOOCW end of the Spectrum, so as 
to overcome the problems asserted above for current doctrine. 
 
Projectspace. The competitor to the Battle-space concept, at the MOOCW end of the 
Spectrum of Conflict, may be the Project-space.  
 
Project-space refers to the programs of Projects being undertaken, in many conflicts, to 
build or rebuild communities, against the interference of well resourced, active and 
determined opposition, including armed opposition.  
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Wainright [2008] refers to such projects by the 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment, in Health, 
Education, Infrastructure, Security and Capacity Building as ‘protected reconstruction 
operations’. Here, the non-battle activity of reconstruction is the ‘main effort’ (a tactical 
term), and the battle-space activity of protection is secondary (at least until the 
reconstruction comes under fire) 
 
The impact of armed opposition on such projects may suggest that these projects need to 
be categorised separately, as ‘Redfield’ or Red Projects.  
 
Integration. One competitor to ‘Mission’, as a primary focus for Defence Force 
operations, may be ‘Integration’, the core concept of Project Management. 
 
‘Integration’ of Corps assets for the effect that they can produce upon the battle-space is 
the strength that the concept of the BOS brings to Warfighting in Conventional War. 
 
The power of ‘Mission’ and of ‘Mission Command’, especially at the heavy Warfighting 
end of the Spectrum of Conflict, is the Integration that mission-centric behaviours bring 
to large scale operations. The alignment to the Superior Commander’s ‘Mission’, across 
the breadth and down the hierarchy of planning and conduct of manoeuvre and battle, 
amongst very large combat organisations, is essential to success.  
 
Mission Command is essentially an integrator of all efforts on a battle or Red Project 
 
‘Mission’, as an ‘integrator’, however, is enabled by the fact that only one major 
stakeholder is being served during Conventional War. That single stakeholder is, of 
course, the Supreme Commander. 
 
‘Integration’ is the key to successful project and program management. It might be the 
higher order, more generic goal than ‘mission’. This possibility may be made more 
evident when there are multiple, major, non-battle stakeholders, other than the Supreme 
Commander, to be served by military operations  
 
What may be needed is a different approach, or a companion approach, to the 
understanding of the differences in different types of conflict.  
 
An approach might be more helpful to ‘mastery’ if it facilitates a development of doctrine 
at the MOOCW end of the spectrum, a development equal in power and sophistication to 
the doctrine available for the heavy Warfighting end of the same spectrum. 
 
That imbalance, that inadequacy, might be met, at least in part, by concepts from Project 
Management, or from ‘Project-space’, to give the suggestion a military turn of phrase. 
 
To demonstrate these possibilities, this paper starts with two primary elements of Project-
space, namely 
1. ‘Integration’, and, 
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2. ‘The Management of Stakeholders’ 
 
 
Proposal.  
 
A companion approach is offered below, if only to promote consideration of ways of 
developing the sophistication of concepts and methods that might assist the ‘professional 
mastery’ of commanders and corporals at the MOOCW end of the Spectrum at Conflict. 
 
Integration. In lieu of using scale, intensity and duration of conflict to differentiate wars 
and the phases of War, differences in the requirements for integration might form a basis 
for distinguishing types of warfare – it is proposed 
 
Stakeholders. In Project-space, however, the starting point for integration of projects, 
will usually be with the stakeholders 
 
At a first level of analysis, the stakeholder groups in modern warfare appear to be the 
Governance authorities and the Economic entities within the community affected by War. 
 
These two primary groups of stakeholders, it turns out, have sectors or functionaries or 
systems upon which these stakeholder groups depend for a successful outcome from their 
efforts with their own resources. 
 
There are thus some parallels between these sectors or functions and the systems (or 
BOS) that military forces use for success in battle 
 
These primary stakeholder groups, in a sense, have their own ‘space’ in which they seek 
to achieve an effect leading to an outcome  
 
This ‘space’ for the Economy’ has been termed ‘Business-space’ in this paper, and the 
‘space’ for Governance’ has been termed ‘Bureau-space’. 
 
Equivalents to the ‘BOSs’ (or to Combat Functions) for these companion constructs, 
might be: 
 
Business-space (a term already in use at Shrivenham Defence Academy in the 
United Kingdom when the author visited that Academy and was briefed by 
Tactics and Leadership Schools at that Academy, in 2004): 
o Production (eg, agriculture, manufacturing, services) 
o Distribution 
o Markets and Trade (eg, food, fuel, labour, building materials) 
o Banking and Currency 
o Civil law, and, 
 
Bureau-space (allowing all the ‘spaces’ to start with ‘B’: 
o Legitimacy 
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o Public Health 
o Education 
o Public Utilities (eg, power, water, transport, communications) 
o Law & Order (eg, legislation, police, judiciary) 
o Human Rights (eg, speech, association, property) 
 
The integration of the stakeholder spaces within Project-space, with the battle-space 
having the concern of the military commanders, might now be represented by three 
overlapping circles rather than the two circles used in Figure 1 
 
Figure 3 portrays the new construct, termed the Warspace Model for Conflict 
 
The overlaps of the three circles portray the concepts of trade-off and balance that are 
associated with achieving consistency, unification and consolidation of planning across 
competing interests from multiple stakeholders – that constitutes an Integration.  
 
In multiple stakeholder projects, agreement upon a consistent, unified, consolidated Plan 
is the essential outcome from ‘Integration’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Warspace Model for Types of Conflict [McMahon 2004] 
 
 
The primacy of the ‘battle-space’ concept for mastery of the Profession at Arms can be 
maintained by placing the Battlespace Circle as the top circle in the three overlapping 
circles on the ‘Warspace’ model. 
 
All of these ‘operating systems’, from the Bureau-space and Business-space constructs, 
have been the targets of enemies in past and current conflicts.  
 
They have also been functions that have been operated by Defence Forces in situations of 
breakdowns in the operations of communities. 
 
Rocket fire upon schools for girls, and upon oil infrastructure, betray the diverse nature of 
conflicts at the MOOCW end and MOOTW end of the Spectrum. 
Battle-space 
Bureau-space Business-space 
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The important Civil-Military Integration projects can be identified with this construct, 
say, at the overlap of the three circles of the ‘Warspace’ model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Pre Conflict        Conflict     Post Conflict 
 
Figure 4: Phases of Conflict in Iraq 
 
The variations in types of conflict can be portrayed by changes in the relative sizing of 
the circles in the Warspace Model, as demonstrated in Figure 4 
 
 
Changes at Hand.  
 
The concepts and ideas about Integration and the Warspace Model, herein proposed, are 
alive in the language of the ‘Chiefs’ of the Defence Forces in Australia, Britain and the 
United States.  
 
Warner [2008], when referring to the campaign in Afghanistan, describes the “three 
pillars” of security, reconstruction and governance when advocating the parameters 
being used for measuring the progress in that campaign.  
 
These three pillars clearly fit, one pillar into each of the three circles on the Warspace 
Model, if they are not near synonyms for the descriptors, ‘Battle’, ‘Business’ and 
‘Bureau’. 
 
Houston [2010] attributes compatible thinking and intentions to the Commander of 
NATO and US Forces in Afghanistan, regarding the same Afghanistan campaign: 
• The strategy of the Commander is an Integration Strategy 
• The main game is Governance, it is a Governance led campaign, Governance is 
the number one operational priority 
• Successful operations have adopted a completely integrated approach 
• Defence Forces will blunt the insurgency, in order to provide time for the 
resolution of political issues that are undermining Governance 
 
Sanctions 
(business-
space) 
Invasion 
(battlespace) 
Elections 
(bureauspace) 
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Koring [2010] quotes principal commentators from the United States, asserting that, 
while the Afghanistan campaign will be very demanding and very intense, it will require 
an extraordinary degree of integration 
 
Currently, formal doctrine in the Australian Defence Force for Land Operations is based 
on the concept of Adaptive Campaigning along five lines of operation: 
 
1. Joint Land Combat    [Battlespace] 
2. Population Protection   [Battlespace-Bureauspace] 
3. Public Information    [Business-space – Bureauspace] 
4. Population Support    [Bureauspace] 
5. Indigenous Capacity Building  [Business-space – Bureauspace] 
 
 
The Doctrine uses the word ‘orchestration’ across the five lines of operation, rather than 
‘Integration’. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Project Management methodology can bring more sophistication to military doctrine for 
the planning and conduct of complex war.  
 
Integration of the interests of the primary stakeholder groups, namely the Force in 
theatre, the Governance in the community, and the Entities in business appears to be a 
more realistic approach to doctrine than any stretch of battle concepts into non-battle 
situations 
 
The three overlapping circles in the Warspace Model have more potential, for depicting 
the true character of each conflict, and for capturing the primary differences between 
conflicts, than the two circle Spectrum representation 
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